Operational costs from Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) alongside trading shortfalls have driven losses under the Bank of Ghana’s (BoG) Gold for Reserves (G4R) programme to US$214 million within the first nine months of 2025, according to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Fifth Review report.
The disclosure is contained in the IMF staff report on Ghana’s three year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme released on December 17, 2025, which flags the losses as a key downside risk to the country’s broader stabilization agenda.
According to the Fund, the losses were largely driven by trading losses incurred under the artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) doré gold transactions component of the programme, as well as off takers’ fees linked to GoldBod operations.
“In 2025 through end Q3, losses from the artisanal and small scale (ASM) doré gold transactions component of G4R have reached US$214 million, mostly on trading losses but also on GoldBod off takers’ fees,” the report stated.
The figures represent approximately GHS 2.6 billion at current exchange rates, highlighting the substantial costs incurred through commodity backed interventions aimed at stabilizing the economy and managing foreign exchange pressures.
The losses follow similar significant setbacks recorded under the previous government’s Gold for Oil programme, which the Bank of Ghana acknowledged resulted in losses of GHS 2.137 billion over two years. The central bank reported losses of GHS 317 million in 2023 and GHS 1.82 billion in 2024 before officially ending the initiative on March 13, 2025.
The Bank of Ghana attributed most of the Gold for Oil losses to foreign exchange fluctuations, though key details about volumes acquired, commissions paid and intermediaries involved remained undisclosed. The programme was introduced in December 2022 as an alternative strategy to purchasing petroleum products with dollars amid sharp cedi depreciation and depleted foreign reserves.
The IMF report’s revelation about GoldBod losses indicates that commodity backed programmes continue to present financial challenges for the central bank despite policy adjustments.
GoldBod was established in early 2025 as part of government efforts to formalize gold trading, improve foreign exchange inflows and support macroeconomic stability by centralizing gold purchasing, selling and export activities.
Beyond the reported losses, the IMF cautioned that the rapidly expanding scale of the programme, particularly since the creation of GoldBod, could expose Ghana to heightened risks.
The Fund noted that the “large and increasing scale of the Gold for Reserves programme, notably since the creation of GoldBod, is a source of significant downside risks.”
A JoyNews Research assessment explains that the warning reflects growing financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. As the programme scales up, it becomes more exposed to losses arising from pricing gaps, execution challenges, service charges and off taker discounts.
With more gold purchases and more transactions passing through the system, even relatively small inefficiencies can generate outsized losses. The trend could also place pressure on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet and monetary policy credibility if the central bank continues to absorb losses or indirectly finance the programme.
According to the IMF, these losses have contributed to ongoing strains on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet, complicating efforts to restore the central bank’s financial position after years of monetary financing, exchange rate volatility and policy interventions outside conventional central banking functions.
However, the IMF report suggests that pricing inefficiencies, operational costs and market risks have translated into significant financial losses for the central bank despite GoldBod’s stated objectives of formalizing the gold trade and capturing foreign exchange that previously leaked through unofficial channels.
BoG Governor Johnson Asiama has previously defended GoldBod’s performance, stating in an IMF interview published earlier in December that the initiative has generated about $8 billion since its March 2025 launch. He explained that GoldBod addresses leakages where foreign exchange from gold sales wasn’t returning to Ghana through a revolving system whereby exports bring foreign exchange to the central bank, which provides cedi equivalents for further purchases.
The governor noted that reserves have grown to about four and a half months of import cover compared with just two weeks during the crisis. GoldBod also recently announced that it exceeded its 2025 small scale gold export target of 100 tons, generating over $10 billion in foreign exchange.
The apparent contradiction between GoldBod’s claimed success in generating foreign exchange and the IMF’s disclosure of substantial losses highlights questions about the programme’s net financial impact. While gross foreign exchange generation has been substantial, the losses indicate that operational costs, pricing structures and trading inefficiencies are eroding potential gains.
The controversy arrives as GoldBod operates under the leadership of Chief Executive Officer Sammy Gyamfi, who also serves as National Communications Officer of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC). His dual role has attracted political scrutiny, with critics questioning whether appropriate commercial expertise guides the institution’s operations.
The IMF’s concerns about transparency and oversight in state owned enterprises operating in the gold sector reflect broader governance challenges. The Fund has consistently emphasized in its reviews that efforts to improve transparency and oversight need to continue, particularly in the management of SOEs in the gold, cocoa and energy sectors.
Finance Minister Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson announced plans in the 2026 budget to allocate the cedi equivalent of US$279 million as a revolving fund for GoldBod, allowing it to purchase and export at least three tonnes of gold per week from small scale miners. The government also abolished the 1.5 percent withholding tax on unprocessed gold winnings by small scale miners to incentivize formalization.
These policy measures aim to increase the country’s foreign exchange reserves while formalizing a sector that has long been vulnerable to smuggling and illicit financial flows. However, the IMF’s disclosure of substantial losses raises questions about whether additional funding will address underlying operational inefficiencies or simply expand a loss making programme.
The Gold for Reserves programme was designed to build the central bank’s international reserves while supporting small scale miners. The Bank of Ghana had launched a domestic gold purchase programme in June 2021, partnering with the then Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC), now rebranded as GoldBod, to buy gold doré from local miners in cedis and refine it abroad for Ghana’s official reserves.
That programme aimed to double Ghana’s gold reserves within five years from the then 8.74 tonnes. Central bank data indicates the stockpile now exceeds 32 tonnes, nearly quadrupling in under four years. The domestic gold purchase programme was later expanded to include the Gold for Oil framework before transitioning to the current Gold for Reserves structure under GoldBod.
The mechanics involve GoldBod purchasing doré in cedis from miners, then selling it internationally through designated brokers. The brokers convert the gold to U.S. dollars and deposit proceeds into the Bank of Ghana’s offshore accounts, which should theoretically strengthen reserves. However, the IMF’s findings suggest that the gap between purchase prices, operational costs, broker fees and international sale prices has generated substantial losses.
Market analysts note that artisanal and small scale mining gold typically trades at discounts to international spot prices due to lower purity levels requiring refining, transportation costs, insurance and the risk premium associated with informal sector transactions. These structural factors mean that even efficiently run programmes face margin pressures.
The challenge for policymakers is determining whether the losses represent temporary startup costs and pricing adjustments that will improve as the system matures, or whether they indicate fundamental flaws in the programme’s design that will generate persistent losses regardless of operational improvements.
The timing of the IMF disclosure is particularly sensitive given that it arrives shortly after GoldBod publicly celebrated exceeding its export targets. The institution had positioned itself as a success story in formalizing small scale mining and generating foreign exchange, making the revelation of substantial losses potentially damaging to its credibility.
Political opponents have seized on the IMF findings to question the government’s economic management, drawing parallels between current losses and those incurred under the previous administration’s Gold for Oil programme. The comparison suggests that successive governments have struggled to design commodity backed interventions that achieve foreign exchange objectives without incurring substantial fiscal costs.
The Bank of Ghana faces pressure to balance multiple objectives: building international reserves, supporting the small scale mining sector, preventing gold smuggling, maintaining monetary policy credibility and avoiding quasi fiscal losses that undermine its balance sheet. Achieving all these goals simultaneously through GoldBod appears challenging given the structural constraints and market realities.
The IMF’s warning about downside risks reflects concern that scaling up a loss making programme could compound fiscal pressures at a time when Ghana is working to restore macroeconomic stability under its ECF arrangement. The Fund has emphasized throughout its reviews the importance of limiting the central bank’s quasi fiscal activities and strengthening its independence.
As Ghana approaches the scheduled completion of its IMF programme in May 2026, the performance of initiatives like GoldBod will factor into assessments of whether the country has established sustainable economic policies or whether vulnerabilities remain that could require continued international support.
For now, the $214 million in losses disclosed in the IMF report stands as a stark reminder that generating foreign exchange through commodity interventions involves substantial costs that must be weighed against the benefits of formalization and reserve accumulation.
*Credit: News Ghana
